International Bureaucracies as “Runaway Agents”? How Organizational Structure Affects Agency Slack
Over the past decades states have delegated extensive decision-making authority to the administrative bodies of international organizations. These international bureaucracies are setting agendas, participate in decision-making processes, implement policy programs, represent states in international organizations, create new regulatory agencies, and even settle disputes among states. Their gradual process of empowerment has been accompanied by an increase in oversight mechanisms, as member states, in some cases, considered that international bureaucracies had undertaken actions contrary to their intentions and overstepped their mandates (agency slack). Accordingly, international bureaucracies are sometimes portrayed as “runaway agents” that escaped the control of their principals (member states). This prompts a key question for research on international bureaucracies in global governance: under what conditions do secretariats of international organizations engage in agency slack – deviating from their mandate and acting in a way unintended by their principals?
To address this question, this project takes a Multi-Method Research approach that is suited to test and further develop principal-agent theory. We employ fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis and fuzzy-set ideal type analysis for a systematic cross-case comparison and, subsequently, process-tracing for an in-depth study of selected international bureaucracies, each of which are analyzed for specific policies. We test our theoretical expectations on 27 international bureaucracies, where we gather data on four organizational characteristics: fragmentation, staffing rules, buffering, and permeability. The chosen approach will allow us to investigate necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of agency slack, to identify underlying causal mechanisms, and to assess the plausibility of alternative explanations. The insights gained from the project will enable us to map different patterns of agency slack and explain under which organizational structures international bureaucracies act against their principals’ preferences. Showing how organizational structure matters by comparing different international bureaucracies will enrich principal-agent theory and help us bridge the gap between theoretical considerations and empirical work in the field.
This project was funded between 2018 and 2021 by the German Research Foundation (DFG).
Heldt, E.C., Mello, P.A., Novoselova, A. & Ramon Serrano Oswald, O. (2022): When Do International Organizations Engage in Agency Slack? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of United Nations Institutions, Global Studies Quarterly, 2(3), 1-15.
Heldt, E.C., Mello, P.A., Novoselova, A. & Ramon Serrano Oswald, O. (2022): Persistence Against the Odds: How Entrepreneurial Agents Helped the UN Joint Inspection Unit to Prevail, Global Policy, 13(2), 235–246.
Novoselova, A. (2022): Disengagement from International Organsiations: The Role of Domestic Politics, Doctoral Dissertation, Technical University of Munich.